Ongoing Investigation·Dec 2025 – Present·KAUST CyberSaR

Verifiable State for Connected Mobility

Exploring how evolving cyber-physical state can remain independently verifiable under privacy and adversarial constraints.

Cover image for Verifiable State for Connected Mobility
Confidentiality Note: Specific protocol mathematical equations, ongoing benchmark tables, and manuscript text withheld.

Overview & Research Motivation

At the Cyber Security and Resilience Technology (CyberSaR) laboratory under Prof. Ali Shoker, I investigate verifier-centric security and privacy architectures for connected mobility and cyber-physical systems (CPS).

The research investigates how autonomous vehicles and smart roadside infrastructure (V2X) can maintain state continuity, authenticate sensor streams, and execute multi-party verification without disclosing sensitive positional or proprietary operational telemetry. We model cryptographic attestations, zero-knowledge proofs, authenticated Merkle structures, and revocation protocols evaluated under rigorous simulated adversarial environments.

The Core Systems Problem

  • Connected vehicles generate continuous, highly-identifiable telemetry streams. Sharing full sensor data enables third-party verification but destroys user privacy and exposes proprietary OEM operational models.
  • Existing centralized vehicle registries fail under intermittent network connectivity and introduce single points of compromise in safety-critical V2X coordination.
Formulated Question: "How can resource-constrained cyber-physical entities independently verify high-integrity claims from peer nodes without receiving raw physical data or trusting a centralized coordinator?"

Why I Worked on It

"Cyber-physical systems cannot rely on naive Web-style authorization; verification must be fast, resilient to adversarial actors, and capable of operating without an online trusted third party."

My Specific Technical Contributions

  • Formulated verifier-centric validation primitives tailored for low-latency V2X communications.
  • Designed cryptographic commitment schemes and Merkle-tree state accumulators for dynamic vehicle sensor streams.
  • Conducted adversarial stress testing evaluating verifier computational overhead, proof size trade-offs, and resilience to Byzantine nodes.

System Architecture & Verification Pipeline

Verifier-Centric Security Model

Shifts verification burden to lightweight cryptographic validation routines executable on roadside edge units and onboard vehicle ECUs.

Cryptographic State Commitments

Periodically generates zero-knowledge proofs and authenticated data structures over vehicle operational bounds (e.g. speed, maintenance compliance, zone access).

Decentralized Revocation Mechanism

Enables instant revocation of compromised vehicle credentials without full blockchain network consensus latency.

Technical Stack & Tools

C++RustPythonApplied Cryptography PrimitivesV2X Simulation Toolkits

Known Limitations

  • Generating complex zk-SNARK proofs onboard low-power microcontrollers remains computationally demanding; optimizing proof generation via recursive SNARKs is an active focus.

What I Would Test Next

  • Completing formal security proofs under standard universal composability frameworks.
  • Preparing comprehensive experimental manuscript for academic conference submission.

Connected Systems & Inquiries